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This paper shows that the results of Bucci (2005) depend
critically on the assumption that there are no difference between
the intermediate goods share in final output, the returns of
specialization and the degree of market power of monopolistic
competitors. In this paper, we disentangle the market power
parameter from the intermediate goods share in final output and
the returns to specialization. The main result of this paper is the
death of the inverted-U shape relationship between competition and
growth. Indeed, we find a decreasing relationship between
competition and growth which is due to the composition of two
negative effects on growth: resource allocation and Schumpeterian
effects. [JEL Classification: O31; O41]
Nel saggio mostriamo come i risultati di Bucci (Fascicolo IX-
X, Rivista di Politica Economica, 2005) dipendano in maniera chi-
ave dall’assunzione che non ci siano differenze tra la quota dei beni
intermedi nella produzione finale, i rendimenti provenienti della
specializzazione e il grado di potere di mercato dei competitori mo-
nopolistici. Il risultato principale di questa nota è la scomparsa
della relazione ad U invertita tra concorrenza e crescita. Troviamo
una relazione decrescente tra le due, dovuta alla composizione di
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Bucci (2005) studies the impact of competition in the
intermediate goods sector on growth. He uses the Gancia and
Zilibotti (2005) model in which he introduces a different assumption
concerning the production of intermediate goods. Indeed, unlike
Gancia and Zilibotti (2005) who assumes that one need one unit of
final good to produce one unit of intermediate good, Bucci (2005)
does the hypothesis that the firm has to use one unit of labor. This
assumption which is called “resource allocation effect” implies that
labor can be allocated between three sectors: final good,
intermediate goods and research. The interplay between this effect
and the traditional Schumpeterian effect allows to obtain an
interesting result. Indeed, Bucci (2005) finds an inverted-U
relationship between competition and growth. For low value of
competition, more competition is beneficial to growth since it
allows a better allocation of resource without hampering that much
innovation incentives. In this case, the resource allocation effect is
bigger than the profit incentive effect. On the other hand, for high
value of competition, more competition reduces strongly growth
because of the reduction of profit. In this case, the profit incentive
effect is bigger than the resource allocation effect.
Among the assumptions used by Bucci (2005) to derive this
result is that there are no difference between the intermediate
goods share in final output, the returns to specialization and the
degree of market power of monopolistic competitors. This leads
to the natural question whether making such a difference to the
model changes its predictions. In this note, we show that including
this difference into the model developed by Bucci (2005)
eliminates the result mentioned above.
2. - The Model
The model developed is based on Bucci (2005).
1 The economy
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1 We use the notations of BUCCI A. (2005) in order to have a direct comparison
with his model.is structured by three sectors: final good sector, intermediate goods
sector and R&D sector. The final output sector produces output
that can be used for consumption using labor and intermediate
goods. These are available in A varieties and are produced by
employing only labor. The R&D sector creates the blueprints for
new varieties of intermediate goods which are produced by
employing labor and knowledge. These blueprints are sold to the
intermediate goods sector.
2.1 The Final Good Sector
In this sector, atomistic producers engage in perfect
competition. The final good sector produces a composite good Y
by using all the jth type of intermediate goods xj and labor LY.
2
Production is given by:
(1)
where  α, λ and  γ∈]0, 1] are three parameters. This production
function allows us to disentangle the degree of market power of
monopolistic competitors in the intermediate sector 1/α 1, the
intermediate goods share in final output λ and the degree of
returns from specialization λ.
3 In this sense, this model is a
generalization of Bucci (2005) and Benassy (1998) models.
4 If we
normalize to one the price of the final good, the profit of the
representative firm is given by:
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2 Time subscripts are omitted whenever there is no risk of ambiguity.
3 BENASSY J.-P. (1996) made a simple modification of the DIXIT A.K. - STIGLITZ
J.E. (1977) model by disentangling clearly taste for variety and market power. At
the same time, BENASSY J.-P. (1998) and DE GROOT H.L. - NAHUIS R. (1998) show
that the introduction of this modification in an endogenous growth model with
expanding product variety à la GROSSMAN G.M. - HELPMAN E. (1991) affects the
welfare analysis.
4 lndeed, we obtain the BUCCI A. (2005) model by introducing the following
constraints  λ = α, γ =1–α in our model. In the same way, by introducing the
constraint λ = 1, we obtain the BENASSY J.-P. (1998) model.(2)
where wY is the wage rate in the final good sector and pj is the
price of the jth intermediate good. Under perfect competition in
the final output market and the factor inputs markets, the
representative firm chooses intermediate goods and labor in order
to maximize its profit taking prices as given and subject to its




Equation (3) is the inverse demand function for the firm that
produces the jth intermediate good whereas equation (4)
characterizes the demand function of labor.
2.2 The Intermediate Goods Sector
In the intermediate goods sector, producers engage in
monopolistic competition. Each firm produces one horizontally
differentiated intermediate good and has to buy a patented design
before producing it. Following Grossman and Helpman (1991) and
Bucci (2005), we assume that each local intermediate monopolist
has access to the same technology employing only labor lj:
(5) xj = lj
We suppose that firms behavior which produce intermediate
goods is governed by the principle of profit maximization at given
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of firms is the following:
(6) πj = pjxj – wjlj
where wj is the wage rate in the intermediate goods sector. Using
the first order condition, we obtain the price of the jth
intermediate good:
(7)
At the symmetric equilibrium, all firms produce the same
quantity of the intermediate good x, face the same wage rate w
and by consequence fix the same price for their production p. The
price is equal to a constant mark up 1/α over the marginal cost
w. Defining by Lj = ∫0
Nljdj, the total amount of labor employed in
the intermediate goods sector and under the assumption of
symmetry among intermediate goods producers, we can rewrite
the equation (5) as follows:
(8)
Finally, the profit function of the firm which produces the jth
intermediate good is:




2.3 The R&D Sector
There are competitive research firms undertaking R&D.
Following Romer (1990) and Grossman and Helpman (1991), we
assume that new blueprints are produced by using old blueprints
N and an amount of R&D labor LN:
(10)
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Because of the perfect competition in the R&D sector, we can obtain
the real wage in this sector as a function of the profit flows associated
to the latest intermediate in using the zero profit condition:
(11)
where wN represents the real wage earned by R&D labor. PN is the
real value of such a blueprint which is equal to:
(12)
where r is the real interest rate. Given PN, the free entry condition
leads to:
(13)
2.4 The Consumer Behavior
The demand side is characterized by the representative
household who consumes and supplies labor. Following Grossman




where  C is private consumption, ρ > 0 is the rate of pure time
preference. The representative household is endowed with fixed
quantities of labor L that are supplied inelastically. The flow
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5 This specification of the utility function does not alter the results.where W is the total wealth of the agent (measured in units of final
good),  w is the wage rate per unit of labor service. From the
maximization program of the consumer, the necessary and sufficient
conditions for a solution are given by the Keynes-Ramsey rule:
(16) gC = r – ρ
and the transversality condition:
(17)
where μt is the co-state variable.
3. - The Equilibrium and the Steady State
In this section, we characterize the equilibrium and give some
analytical characterizations of a balanced growth path.
3.1 The Equilibrium
It is now possible to characterize the labor market equilibrium
in the economy considered. On this market, because of the
homogeneity and the perfect mobility across sectors, the arbitrage
ensures that the wage rate that is earned by employees who work
in the final good sector, intermediate goods sector or R&D sector
is equal. As a result, the following three conditions must
simultaneously be satisfied
6:
(18) L = LY + Lj + LN
(19) wj = wY
(20) wj = wN
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6 We assume without loss of commonalty that the total labor force is constant.Equation (18) is a resource constraint, saying that at any point
in the time the sum of the labor demands coming from each
activity must be equal to the total available fixed supply. Equation
(19) and equation (20) state that the wage earned by one unit of
labor is to be the same irrespective of the sector where that unit
of labor is actually employed. We can characterize the product
market equilibrium in the economy considered. Indeed, on this
market, the firms produce a final good which can be consumed.
Consequently, the following condition must be satisfied:
(21) Y = C
Equation (21) is a resource constraint on the final good sector.
3.2 The Steady State
At the steady state, all variables as Y, C, N grow at a positive
constant rate. Obviously, it is easy to show from equations (21,
1 and 8) the following relationship between the economic growth
rate, the consumption growth rate and the knowledge growth
rate:
(22) gY = gC = γgN
Using the previous equations, we can demonstrate the
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7 Results (23) through (27) are demonstrated in the APPENDIX.







LL(25) LY =( 1–λ)( L + ηρ)
(26) LN =( 1–α) λ (L + ηρ)–ηρ
(27)
4. - The Relationship Between Product Market Competition
and Growth
In this section, we study the long run relationship between
competition and growth in the model presented above. Following
most authors, we use the so-called Lerner Index to gauge the
intensity of market power within a market. Such an index is
defined by the ratio of price P minus marginal cost CM over price.
Using the definition of a mark up Markup = P/CM and Lerner
Index LernerIndex =( P – CM)/P we can use (7) to define a proxy
of competition as follows
9:
(28) (1 – LernerIndex)=α
We show that our simple generalization of Bucci (2005)’s
model that consists in having the monopolistic mark-up in the
intermediate goods sector, the intermediate goods share in the
final output and the returns to specialization treated separately,
the inverted U relationship between competition and growth no
longer exists.
PROPOSITION 1. The relationship between competition and
growth is negative for all positive values of ρ, η, L and γ and λ
∈] 0, 1].




−+ − γα λη ρ η ρ
η
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9 This is the same measure of product market competition used by AGHION P.
- BLOOM N. - BLUNDELL R. - GRIFFITH R. - HOWITT P. (2005); AGHION P. - GRIFFITH
R. (2005); AGHION P. - HOWITT P. (2005) - BIANCO D. (2006), contrary to BUCCI A. -
PARELLO C. (2006) who link the competition to two components the input shares
in income and the parameter of substitution between intermediates.PROOF. The proof is obtained by differentiating the equation
(27) with respect to α:
(29)
In order to illustrate this result, we plot the equation (27) for
different values of competition α, and returns to specialization γ
10:
According to the profit incentive effect, an increase of
competition reduces the price of the intermediate good and profit,
what determines the incentives to innovation. Therefore, the profit
incentive effect seems to predict an unambiguously negative












RIVISTA DI POLITICA ECONOMICA SETTEMBRE-OTTOBRE 2007
254
GRAPH 1
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMPETITION α, RETURNS TO
















10 In drawing Graph 1, we take the same value of parameters like BUCCI A.
(2005) in order to be as close as possible to his model: ρ = 0.03, η = 1, L = 35 and
λ = 0.75.relationship between product market competition and growth
along the entire range of competition intensity. Contrary to Bucci
(2005), an increase of competition reduces the amount of labor
devoted to the research sector LN along the entire range of
competition intensity. Moreover, an increase of competition has
no effect on the amount of labor allocated to the final good sector
LY and increases the amount of labor in the intermediate goods
sector Lj. This means that the resource allocation effect seems also
to predict an unambiguously negative relationship between
product market competition and growth. Finally, we always have
as we can see on the above figure a decreasing relationship
between competition and growth.
5. - Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a generalization of Bucci (2005)
model in which we disentangle the monopolistic mark-up in the
intermediate goods sector, the intermediate goods share in the
final output and the returns to specialization. Our main finding
is that the result of the Bucci (2005) model that close in an
inverted U relationship between competition and growth depends
critically on the assumptions that there are no differences between
these three parameters. Indeed, for all values of parameters except
to  λ = α, we could remove the inverted-U relationship between
competition and growth. This result is due to the interplay of two
effects: Schumpeterian and resource allocation effects. In our
model, we find that the resource allocation effect is always
negative which reinforces the Schumpeterian effect on growth.
Consequently, we find a decreasing relationship between compet-
ition and growth.
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In this appendix, we describe the way followed in order to
obtain the main results of this paper (23 through 27). Using the
equations (3, 4, 7, 8 and 19), we obtain
(30)
Plugging this equation into equation (18) yields
(31)
Consequently, the equation (30) can be re-written as:
(32)
In order to compute the wage in the research sector, we need
to have the value of the blueprint in the steady state (equations 9
and 12) which is:
(33)
Given PN and using equation (13), we obtain:
(34)
In equating wj to wN, we find:
(35)
Using the equations (31 and 35), we obtain:
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In order to determine the equilibrium interest rate, we use
these two equations:
(38) gY = gC = r – ρ
(39) gY = γgN
After some computations, we obtain:
(40)
Finally, from the previous equations, we obtain the rest of
variables of the model:
(41) Lj = αλ (L + ηρ)
(42) LY =( 1–λ)( L + ηρ)
(43) LN =( 1–α) λ (L + ηρ) – ηρ
(44)
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